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Introduction
n an interview that took place some years ago
at a hospital in Geneva, a 63-year-old female psychiatrist,
Mrs B, recollected a pleasant visit earlier that day with
her mother and brother. She also looked forward to a
reception later in the day that she would be hosting at
her home. Mrs B was utterly convinced that these events
were real, but in fact they were not: Mrs B was herself
a patient in the hospital, where she was recovering from
a brain hemorrhage. Mrs B had confabulated these
events, which had no basis in reality.
1
While the disconnection between memory and objective
reality that is evident in Mrs B’s case is attributable to
her brain damage, not all such disconnections reflect the
influence of brain pathology; far from it. For example,
memory and reality often conflict in eyewitness testi-
mony, where different observers of the same event
sometimes recollect that event in dramatically different
ways. One striking but fairly typical example is provided
by the death of Jean Charles de Menezes, an innocent
man who was fatally shot in July 2005 by London police
in a subway station, because he had been misidentified
by them as one of several men responsible for a failed
bombing attempt the previous day. Eyewitness accounts
of what transpired differed substantially.
2While the offi-
cers “recalled running on to the Underground platform
at Stockwell and challenging de Menezes by shouting
‘Armed Police,’ before shooting him seven times in the
head,” 17 civilian witnesses had no memory that this
phrase had been uttered. The police claimed that de
Menezes had gotten up and moved “aggressively” at
them, but according to the memories of some witnesses,
7
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de Menezes never got up from his seat. Indeed,
“Everyone recalled a slightly different sequence of
events, even when it came to such basic facts as the num-
ber of bullets fired or the clothes de Menezes was wear-
ing.” 
2
While it is difficult to be certain whose memories are
accurate and whose are not in such a case, it seems rea-
sonably clear that some witnesses to the de Menezes
shooting remembered it incorrectly. Such a conclusion is
consistent with many controlled studies showing that
eyewitnesses are prone to memory errors, including
highly confident but demonstrably false memories.
3-5
These faulty memories can have serious consequences:
inaccurate eyewitness testimony was a key factor in
approximately 75% of the first hundred cases of indi-
viduals exonerated by DNA evidence after being con-
victed of crimes they did not commit.
6,7
These and related observations lend support to a view
of memory that has its roots in the work of the British
psychologist Bartlett,
8 who argued, based on his exper-
imental observations of mistakes and distortions in the
recall of stories, that human memory is not a simple rote
or reproductive system. By contrast, memory involves
complex constructive processes that are sometimes prone
to error: when we remember, we piece together frag-
ments of stored information under the influence of our
current knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs.
A good deal of progress has been made in understand-
ing the constructive nature of memory since the publi-
cation of Bartlett’s
8 classic studies. That progress has
begun to accelerate during recent years, as a result of
research using the methods of cognitive psychology and
cognitive neuroscience to elucidate both the cognitive
and neural processes that underpin constructive mem-
ory.
9-13 The purpose of the present paper is to consider
recent ideas and evidence concerning three aspects of
constructive memory for which significant new findings
and ideas have emerged during the past few years. First,
the article will consider the idea that certain kinds of
memory distortions reflect the operation of adaptive cog-
nitive processes—that is, processes that contribute to the
efficient functioning of memory, but as a result of doing
so, also produce distortions.
14-17 Second, it will focus on
recent research that is beginning to elucidate the nature
of an adaptive cognitive process that has been linked to
constructive memory: imagining or simulating possible
future events.
18,19Third, it will consider whether it is pos-
sible to reliably distinguish between true and false mem-
ories, and discuss some recent attempts to do so using
functional neuroimaging techniques. 
Are memory distortions adaptive?
Clinical instances of confabulation following brain dam-
age, such as the case of Mrs B considered earlier,
encourage the view that memory distortion reflects dys-
functional cognitive processing. And, indeed, it is known
that various kinds of brain damage can result in an
increased incidence of memory distortion. For example,
during the 1990s Schacter et al studied a patient, BG,
who suffered damage to his right frontal lobe after a
stroke.
20,21 BG showed a dramatic increase in the inci-
dence of a memory error known as false recognition,
where one claims to recognize as familiar an object, face,
word, or scene that is in fact novel. Across a range of
memory tests, BG falsely recognized—with high confi-
dence—various kinds of novel stimuli. More recently,
Moulin et al
22 described a related syndrome in cases of
dementia and diffuse temporal lobe pathology, that they
termed déjà vecu, where patients claim to recollect past
“experiences” that are actually novel. For example,
patient AKP constantly stopped watching television
because he claimed to remember seeing every show pre-
viously, and when going on a daily walk, “AKP com-
plained that it was the same bird in the same tree singing
the same song… He also read car number plates and
stated that the drivers must have very regular habits,
always passing by at the exact same time every day.” 
22
Links between memory distortion and dysfunctional
processing have also been made in healthy, non-brain-
damaged individuals. Several studies have found that
individuals who frequently report disruptions in con-
sciousness or dissociative experiences also tend to show
increased rates of false recognition and related memory
distortions.
23-26 More recent research has linked propen-
sity to memory distortion with low intelligence
27 and
symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder.
28 Based on
these kinds of observations, it seems justified to conclude
that memory errors and distortions, and the constructive
memory processes that give rise to them, reflect deficient
processing and perhaps fundamental flaws in the archi-
tecture of the memory system.
In contrast to this line of reasoning, there is mounting
evidence that several different kinds of memory distor-
tions reflect the influence of adaptive processes that are
beneficial for cognitive function, but nonetheless also
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result in memory errors.
15 This line of argument can be
traced to the classic studies of Bartlett,
8 who took what
could be characterized as an adaptive view when dis-
cussing the memory distortions that he observed during
recall of stories. Bartlett believed that these distortions
were based on the operation of a schema that serves to
organize and interpret incoming information in light of
previous experiences. My own writing about the seven
“sins” of memory,
16,17 has tried to make the case that each
of the seven sins reflect, to some extent, the operation of
adaptive cognitive processes. However, while these and
related arguments
9,14 are plausible, there has been rela-
tively little direct experimental data in support of them
until the past few years. As an example, let us consider
evidence that has accumulated for the adaptive nature
of what are called gist-based or associative memory dis-
tortions.
15
Gist-based and associative memory errors are closely
related. Gist-based errors occur when people falsely
remember a novel item that is similar to an item that
they encountered previously, making their memory deci-
sion based on the gist of what happened, whereas asso-
ciative memory errors occur when people falsely
remember a novel item that is an associate of previously
studied items. Understanding of these kinds of memory
distortions has been advanced by studies using the
“DRM paradigm,” which was developed initially by
Deese,
29 and later modified by Roediger and
McDermott.
30 In this procedure, participants hear or
view lists of related words (eg, candy, sour, sugar, bitter,
good, taste, tooth, etc) that are all associates of a non-
presented “critical lure” word (eg, sweet). Numerous
studies have shown that participants often falsely recall
or recognize the nonpresented associates, and do so with
high confidence.
31,32 Researchers have used related par-
adigms for producing gist-based memory errors. For
example, after studying patterns or shapes that are phys-
ically similar to a nonpresented prototype, participants
later are likely to falsely recognize the novel prototype
as a previously studied item.
33,34 Similarly, after studying
numerous pictures or words from a particular category,
people are likely to later show false recall or false recog-
nition of nonpresented category members from the pre-
viously presented categories.
35,36
While such responses are classified appropriately as
memory distortions—people claim to remember items
that they have never encountered before—those errors
also reflect retention of useful information concerning
the general themes, appearances, or meanings that par-
ticipants did encounter. Retention of such information
can facilitate the ability to generalize and abstract,
9,16,17,37,38
and in that sense can be considered adaptive.
Several kinds of experimental evidence support the idea
that gist-based and associative memory errors indeed
reflect the operation of adaptive processes. First, both
associative and gist-based false recognition are reduced
in patients with amnesic syndromes resulting from dam-
age to the medial temporal lobes, thereby suggesting that
such errors normally reflect the operation of a healthy
memory system.
39-41 Second, recent studies have linked
associative false recognition and creativity. In one study
study, Howe et al
42 presented DRM associate lists to chil-
dren and adults before these participants attempted to
solve compound remote associate task problems.
Participants were presented with three word puzzles (eg,
walk/beauty/over) and attempted to generate a solution
word that is associated with all three target words (eg,
sleep). When they were primed with DRM lists (eg, bed,
rest, awake, tired, dream, etc) for which the solution word
on the problem-solving task was the critical lure (eg,
sleep), both children and adults showed improved per-
formance on the problem-solving tasks compared with
problems that were not primed by DRM lists.
Importantly, however, this effect was observed only
when participants falsely recalled the critical lure,
thereby bolstering the authors’ claim that false memo-
ries can have beneficial effects on cognitive function
under certain conditions. In another recent study linking
creativity and associative false recognition, Dewhurst et
al
43 showed that susceptibility to DRM false recognition
is predicted by performance on a remote associates task.
This task is generally viewed as a measure of convergent
thinking—a component of creativity that taps an indi-
vidual’s ability to generate broad and numerous associ-
ations, and can thus be considered an adaptive cognitive
process. By contrast, DRM false recognition was not pre-
dicted by performance on a task that required generat-
ing alternate uses of an object, which is thought to tap
divergent thinking (ie, the capacity to generate a range
of different possible solutions to a problem).
Third, a growing number of neuroimaging studies have
documented that many of the same brain regions are
active during associative/gist-based true and false recog-
nition.
34,44-47 Consistent with the foregoing studies, Garoff-
Eaton et al
48 observed extensive overlap in neural activ-
ity when participants made false recognition responses
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to shapes that were visually similar to those that they
had studied (ie, during gist-based false recognition). In
contrast, there was no neural overlap between true and
false recognition when participants had false alarms to
novel shapes that were unrelated to previously studied
shapes, which likely reflected guessing, or other
processes that did not reflect gist-based responding.
Thus, gist-based false recognition, but not unrelated or
“baseline” false recognition, recruits the same regions
that are associated with true recognition.
Fourth, neuroimaging studies that have examined the
origins of gist-based or associative false recognition dur-
ing the process of encoding have likewise provided evi-
dence in line with an adaptive interpretation. For exam-
ple, it has been demonstrated that levels of gist-based
false recognition of new words from previously studied
categories are associated with increased activation of left
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex during encoding of cate-
gorized words
49,50; similar findings have been obtained
when participants encode common objects and later
falsely recognize new objects from the same category.
51
Critically, these studies also showed that recruitment of
left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex is associated with
increased subsequent true recognition and earlier work
linked this region with semantic or elaborative encoding
processes.
52 Taken together, the foregoing findings pro-
vide an empirical basis for arguing that semantic elab-
oration processes during encoding, which serve the
adaptive function of promoting long-term retention, can
also contribute to memory distortion.
Finally, a closely related line of evidence comes from a
recent fMRI study that applied the same kind of encod-
ing-based analysis described in the aforementioned stud-
ies to false recognition of contextual associations.
Aminoff et al
53 had participants encode a series of object
pairs while in the scanner by trying to mentally relate the
objects to a context. 
The pairs consisted of either two contextually related
objects that belong to the same context, such as a bull-
dozer and a yellow construction cone, or two objects that
are typically not associated with a specific context or
contextually related to each other, such as a camera and
a pair of scissors. The next day, participants were given
an old/new recognition test that included previously
studied objects, unrelated new objects, and, critically, new
objects that were contextually related to one of the pre-
viously studied context pairs (eg, a construction helmet).
We hypothesized that increased activity during encod-
ing in cortical regions previously identified as part of a
network that supports contextual processing
54,55 would
predict subsequent false recognition of contextually
related objects, and the results supported this hypothe-
sis. Perhaps most important from an adaptive perspec-
tive, encoding-related activity in the retrosplenial com-
plex predicted subsequent false recognition of
contextually related objects. Bar and Aminoff
54 have the-
orized that this region is involved in the processing of
“context frames,” which represent generic or prototypi-
cal information about a context. Activation of a context
frame during encoding is adaptive because it can facili-
tate recognition of other objects in the environment by
allowing predictions about what is likely to occur in a
particular context.
56
These studies provide compelling evidence favoring an
adaptive account of gist-based and associative errors.
Schacter et al
15 also discussed additional evidence and
ideas that point toward an adaptive interpretation for
other kinds of memory distortions, including post-event
misinformation effects
10 and imagination inflation,
57-59
where imagining events can lead to false beliefs and
memories that they did occur. Our adaptive account of
imagination inflation relied heavily on recent observa-
tions concerning the role of a constructive memory sys-
tem in imagining future events, which will be discussed
in the next section of the paper.
Constructive memory and 
imagining the future
Numerous experiments have demonstrated ways in
which imagining events can lead to the development of
false memories for those events.
57-64 During the past sev-
eral years, neuroimaging studies have revealed striking
overlap in the neural processes that are engaged when
people remember past events and imagine future events
or novel scenes,
65-70 and behavioral studies have docu-
mented similarly striking similarities in the correspond-
ing cognitive processes.
18,19,71-79 The similarities docu-
mented in these studies can help to understand why
memory and imagination can be easily confused: they
share common neural and cognitive underpinnings. 
In addition, we have argued that these observations are
relevant to thinking about the adaptive functions of a
constructive memory system. Specifically, Schacter and
Addis
18 have put forward the constructive episodic simu-
lation hypothesis, which holds that past and future events
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memory in particular) and rely on similar underlying
processes. Episodic memory, in turns, supports the con-
struction of future events by extracting and recombining
stored information into a simulation of a novel event.
Such a system is adaptive because it enables past infor-
mation to be used flexibly in simulating alternative
future scenarios without engaging in actual behaviors,
but it comes at a cost of vulnerability to errors and dis-
tortions that result from mistakenly combining elements
of imagination and memory. 
One of the most intriguing findings from neuroimaging
studies that is relevant to the constructive episodic sim-
ulation hypothesis concerns the robust activation of the
hippocampus—a region that has long been implicated in
memory—when individuals imagine or simulate future
events. Consider, for example, a study by Addis et al
65 in
which participants were scanned while they were either
remembering a past experience or imagining an event
that might occur in the future. Addis et al divided each
of these tasks into two phases. In the initial construction
phase, participants generated either a remembered or an
imagined event in response to a cue word (eg, “dress”)
and made a button-press when they had an event in
mind, which typically required about 7 or 8 seconds. In
the immediately following elaboration phase, partici-
pants generated as much detail as possible about the
remembered or imagined event. The most striking find-
ing was that brain activity was highly similar during
remembering the past and imagining the future. This
overlap was most apparent during the elaboration phase,
when participants focused on generating details about
the remembered or imagined event. A core network
77 of
brain regions that had previously been implicated in the
retrieval of episodic memories, and has also been linked
to a variety of internally driven cognitive processes,
80,81
showed common activation during both remembering
and imagining, including the hippocampus, parahip-
pocampal and retrosplenial cortices, medial prefrontal
and frontopolar cortices, and lateral parietal lobe. 
The common activation observed in the hippocampus
was especially intriguing, possibly reflecting the retrieval
or integration of event details into the remembered or
imagined representation. Moreover, during the con-
struction phase, the right hippocampus was engaged to
a greater extent when participants imagined future
events than when they remembered past events. Because
the hippocampus has been implicated in relational pro-
cessing (ie, linking together previously unrelated
items
82), Addis et al suggested that this finding might
reflect the additional relational processing required
when one recombines disparate details into an imagined
future event.
18,83,84
Following up on the foregoing findings with respect to
hippocampal activity, Addis and Schacter
85 examined the
relationship between brain activity and the amount of
detail reported for remembered and imagined events
during the elaboration phase. Addis and Schacter
observed that activity in the left posterior hippocampus
was correlated with the amount of detail comprising
both remembered and imagined events, whereas the left
anterior hippocampus responded specifically to the
amount of detail comprising imagined but not remem-
bered events. In line with the previous discussion, Addis
and Schacter suggested that this latter finding could
reflect activity associated with the recombination of
details into an imagined future event. 
More direct evidence on this point is provided by a study
that made use of a novel experimental recombination
paradigm.
86 Participants initially provided episodic mem-
ories of actual experiences that included details about a
person, object, and place involved in that event. During
a later scanning session, they were cued to recall some
of the events that had actually occurred. For the condi-
tions in which they imagined events, the experimenters
randomly recombined details concerning person, object,
and place from separate episodes. Then, during scanning,
participants were given cues for a person, object, and
place taken from distinct episodes, and were instructed
to imagine a single, novel episode that included the spec-
ified details. In some cases, participants were instructed
to imagine possible future events, whereas in others, they
were instructed to imagine events that might have
occurred in the past. As in previous studies, robust hip-
pocampal activity was observed when participants
recombined details into an imaginary scenario.
While these findings are consistent with a role for the
hippocampus in recombining episodic details, Martin et
al have recently examined whether the hippocampus also
plays a role in a closely related process: encoding recom-
bined details into memory. Several decades ago, Ingvar
88
developed an idea that he called “memory of the future”:
when we simulate an upcoming future scenario, we need
to encode and store that simulation for later use in order
to maximize its adaptive effect on future behavior.
Although next to nothing is known about the neural
11
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al
87 hypothesized a role for the hippocampus. To investi-
gate the issue, we examined whether hippocampal activ-
ity during simulations of future experiences is related to
memory for those simulations by using the experimental
recombination paradigm described earlier
86 together with
the well-established “subsequent memory” procedure,
where brain activity during encoding is related to
whether an item is later remembered or forgotten on a
memory test. The subsequent memory procedure has
been used successfully in numerous previous studies on
the neural correlates of encoding processes.
89,90
During scanning, participants imagined future events
comprised of recombined person, location, and object
details that were taken from their own memories pro-
vided in a prescanning session. A few minutes after com-
pletion of the scan, participants were given an unex-
pected cued recall test that probed memory of their
simulation: they were provided with two details from the
simulation and were instructed to recall the third detail.
Simulations for which participants provided the missing
detail were classified as “remembered,” and those for
which participants did not provide the correct missing
detail were classified as “forgotten,” thereby providing
an objective measure of whether the details from each
simulation had been successfully encoded. 
Results showed that the core network identified in pre-
vious studies, including the hippocampus, was active
when participants imagined future events (Figure 1).
Critically, we also found that simulations classified as
“remembered” based on subsequent recall performance
were associated with greater activity in right hippocam-
pus at the time of encoding than were simulations that
were classified as “forgotten” (Figure 2). Further, we
found that participants rated the successfully remem-
bered simulations as more detailed than simulations that
were subsequently forgotten, and that activation in brain
regions that showed an encoding effect was modulated
by the level of detail. These observations suggest that
constructing a lasting “memory for the future” is related
to how well details comprising a simulation were
retrieved from memory and recombined during encod-
ing. 
In a related line of research on another aspect of “mem-
ory of the future,” Szpunar et al
91 have examined how
well individuals remember simulations of positive, neg-
ative, or neutral simulations of possible future events.
Episodic simulations typically refer to emotionally
arousing events: recent evidence indicates that roughly
two thirds of thoughts about everyday future events are
12
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Figure 1. Regions of a core network engaged by imagining future
events. In a recent study described in the text,
87 participants
imagined future events including person, place, and object
details that were taken from actual memories. On control trials,
participants created a “size sentence,” ordering three objects by
physical size. The contrast of future events relative to control tri-
als revealed significant activation of a core network identified in
other similar studies, including bilateral medial parietal and pre-
frontal cortices (right and middle) and bilateral medial temporal
lobes and left lateral temporal cortex (left). 
Adapted from ref 87: Martin VC, Schacter DL, Corballis MC, Addis DR.
A role for the hippocampus in encoding simulations of future events. Proc
Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2011;108:13858-13863. Copyright © National
Academy of Sciences 2011.
Figure 2. Hippocampal responses to encoding. In the same study
described in Figure 1,
87 approximately 10 minutes after imag-
ining future events comprised of person, place, and object
details, participants were given a cued recall test in which two
details from the simulation were provided, and they were asked
to recall the third detail. A subsequent memory analysis revealed
clusters in anterior and posterior right hippocampus that showed
significantly greater activity during encoding for those simula-
tions in which details were subsequently remembered vs those
in which details were subsequently forgotten.  
Adapted from ref 87: Martin VC, Schacter DL, Corballis MC, Addis DR.
A role for the hippocampus in encoding simulations of future events. Proc
Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2011;108:13858-13863. Copyright © National
Academy of Sciences 2011.
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either positively or negatively charged.
92 To investigate
memory for such simulations, we used a variant of the
experimental recombination-subsequent memory pro-
cedure used by Martin et al
87 in the previously described
study in which participants imagined future events com-
prised of recombined person, location, and object details.
Each recombined set of details was presented along with
one of three emotional tags—either positive, negative,
or neutral. On each trial, participants were instructed to
generate a plausible future event that might occur within
the next 5 years and that would evoke in them the emo-
tion indicated by the emotional tag. Memory was tested
either after a 10-minute delay or a 1-day delay using the
cued recall procedure described above, ie, participants
were provided with two details from the simulation and
were instructed to recall the third detail (no scanning
was performed in this experiment). 
After the 10-minute delay, recall of details associated
with positive and negative simulations was significantly
greater than recall of details associated with neutral sim-
ulations—a finding that is consistent with a large body
of literature indicating that memory for emotional expe-
riences is typically enhanced compared with memory for
neutral experiences.
93,94 Strikingly, however, at the 1-day
delay, the details associated with negative simulations
were remembered significantly less often than the details
associated with positive and neutral simulations. 
We related this finding to previous studies that have doc-
umented a phenomenon known as “fading affect bias”:
emotional reactions tend to fade more quickly over time
for negative than positive everyday experiences.
95
Perhaps rapid fading of negative affect over time ren-
dered details associated with negative simulations more
difficult to recall than those associated with positive or
neutral simulations. Although additional research will be
required to understand this finding, it may be related in
interesting ways to the simulation of future events in
clinical populations with affective disorders. A number
of studies have shown that patients with depression
96,97
and anxiety
98,99 exhibit impaired simulations of future
events that tend to lack specific detail and are often neg-
atively biased. These observations, as well as related
observations of impaired future simulations in other psy-
chiatric and neurological disorders (for reviews, see refs
19,78), highlight the clinical relevance of research con-
cerning imagining the future. They also suggest that it
will be interesting to examine memory for positive and
negative simulations in depressed and anxious patients
in order to determine whether patterns consistent with
“fading affect bias”—ie, impaired recall of negative sim-
ulations after a long delay versus a short delay—are
absent or reduced in such patients. 
Distinguishing between true and 
false memories
The observation that memory and imagination depend,
at least in part, on a common neural network, raises an
important question: how does the brain distinguish
between memories for actual past experiences and those
that have only been imagined? One clue comes from the
Addis et al
86 study discussed earlier, in which participants
were scanned while remembering actual events consist-
ing of key person-place-object details, or imagining expe-
riences comprised of recombined details from different
memories. As in previous studies, the core network dis-
cussed earlier was activated for both remembering and
imagining. In addition, however, Addis et al
86 noted that
distinct subsystems within the core network were pref-
erentially associated with imagining and remembering,
respectively. The imagining network consisted of medial
temporal lobe including anterior hippocampus, bilateral
medial prefrontal cortex, inferior frontal gyrus, polar and
posterior temporal cortex, and medial parietal cortex.
The remembering network included posterior visual cor-
tices such as fusiform, lingual and occipital gyri and
cuneus, as well as parahippocampal gyrus and posterior
hippocampus. Addis et al
86 suggested that the association
of posterior visual cortices with memory for actual expe-
riences might indicate that reactivation of sensory-per-
ceptual details during memory retrieval recruits the
neural regions involved in the original processing of the
remembered information. Consistent with this sugges-
tion, neuroimaging studies of memory for previously
studied pictures have revealed reactivation during
retrieval of some of the same visual processing regions
that were active during encoding.
100
These observations dovetail nicely with an idea initially
advanced by cognitive psychologists, often referred to as
the sensory reactivation hypothesis, that true memories
tend to contain more sensory and perceptual informa-
tion than do false memories.
62,101 Consistent with this
hypothesis, behavioral studies have shown that retrieval
of true memories is associated with increased access to
sensory and perceptual details compared with retrieval
of false or imaginary memories.
101-105
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More recently, neuroimaging studies in which partici-
pants are scanned during retrieval of true and false
memories have provided additional evidence consistent
with the sensory reactivation hypothesis. For example, in
several neuroimaging studies using the DRM semantic
associates paradigm, participants who were scanned dur-
ing retrieval showed increased activity in sensory-per-
ceptual regions during true recognition as compared
with false recognition.
44-46 However, whether or not such
effects are observed may depend on subtle features of
the experimental design.
13,47,106
In an attempt to examine sensory reactivation effects
using material known to engage perceptual processing
pathways, Slotnick and Schacter
34 used novel visual
shapes as target stimuli. All the shapes that participants
studied were physically similar to prototype shapes that
were not presented during encoding. Following presen-
tation of the study list, participants made old/new recog-
nition decisions about previously studied shapes, non-
studied related shapes, and nonstudied unrelated shapes.
Slotnick and Schacter
34 hypothesized that true recogni-
tion of previously studied shapes, as compared with false
recognition of nonstudied related shapes, would be
accompanied by a sensory signature involving increased
activation of visual processing regions. Consistent with
this hypothesis, there was significantly greater activity
during true than false recognition in regions of primary
visual cortex (eg, BA 17, 18) that are concerned with
processing such features of target stimuli as orientation
and color. By contrast, higher-order visual areas in occip-
ito-temporal cortex (eg, BA 19, 37) showed comparable
levels of activity during true and false recognition. 
Consistent with the foregoing, additional evidence sup-
porting the sensory reactivation hypothesis has been
reported in studies using fMRI to examine the widely
known post-event misinformation effect.
10 In misinfor-
mation studies, participants are exposed to an original
event consisting of a sequence of activities, and are later
given inaccurate information about some aspect of the
original event; on a subsequent memory test, participants
sometimes falsely remember that the post-event misin-
formation was part of the original event. In the first
fMRI study of the misinformation effect, Okado and
Stark
107 scanned participants while they viewed vignettes
(ie, event sequences) that each contained a critical detail
(eg, in one vignette, a man puts a stolen wallet in his
jacket pocket), and also during the post-event misinfor-
mation phase, when participants were exposed to erro-
neous information about what had happened in the orig-
inal event (eg, the man put the stolen wallet in his pants
pocket). Two days later, participants were given a mem-
ory test including both events that occurred in the orig-
inal vignette and those that appeared only in the misin-
formation phase. Okado and Stark
107 found that the
occurrence of the misinformation effect— ie, when par-
ticipants claimed that a bit of misinformation was part
of the initial vignette—was predicted by level of activity
in the medial temporal lobe during encoding of both the
original event and the misinformation. 
In a twist on this paradigm designed to examine the role
of sensory reactivation in the aforementioned effects,
Stark et al had participants view vignettes similar to
those used in the Okado and Stark
107 study. The next day,
during the misinformation phase, participants listened to
a series of sentences; most of them accurately described
what had occurred in the vignette that the participant
viewed the previous day, but some contained misinfor-
mation. Fifteen minutes later, participants were scanned
while they took a memory test that included items from
the original vignette and the misinformation phase. Thus,
true memories—items from the vignette that partici-
pants accurately claimed that they saw in the first
phase—were based on prior visual experience (ie, view-
ing the vignettes). By contrast, false memories—items
from the misinformation phase that participants inaccu-
rately claimed that they saw in the first phase—were
based on auditory information acquired during the mis-
information phase. Stark et al found that true memories
were associated with greater activity in visual cortex
than were false memories (which were associated with
activity in auditory cortex), thereby providing further
support for the sensory reactivation hypothesis. Indeed,
Stark et al
108 noted that true recognition was preferen-
tially associated with activity in early or primary regions
of the visual cortex, thereby supporting and extending
the results of Slotnick and Schacter
34 in a very different
kind of experimental paradigm (see also ref 109). 
Concluding comments
The research reviewed here indicates that we are begin-
ning to establish a neurocognitive foundation for under-
standing the kinds of constructive memory processes
that have been documented and investigated by numer-
ous cognitive psychologists dating back to the pioneer-
ing studies of Bartlett.
8This research provides evidence
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in support of claims that memory distortions often
reflect the operation of adaptive processes, that an
important function of a constructive memory is allowing
individuals to flexibly use past experiences to simulate
possible future events, and that sensory reactivation can
help to distinguish true from false memories.
While the theoretical implications of research on con-
structive memory are important, as noted earlier in the
article this research also has clinical and applied impli-
cations. Research on memory distortion, for example,
played an important role in informing and shaping the
debate over the accuracy of recovered memories of
childhood sexual abuse that raged for over a decade dur-
ing the 1990s and 2000s.
110,111 Demonstrations that imag-
ining events that never happened can sometimes pro-
duce false memories for those events
59,112 alerted both
researchers and clinicians to the possible dangers of
encouraging patients in psychotherapy to imagine child-
hood experiences that might or might not have occurred.
And, indeed, recent research indicates that there are
good reasons to doubt the accuracy of memories of sex-
ual abuse recovered during psychotherapy (in contrast
to memories recovered outside of a therapeutic context,
which tend to be accurate).
111
Research on constructive memory is also relevant under-
standing inaccuracies in eyewitness memory, which are
all too often implicated in wrongful convictions of inno-
cent individuals.
4,5 One frequently posed question con-
cerns whether it is possible to distinguish between accu-
rate and inaccurate eyewitness memories, perhaps by
using neuroimaging techniques. Although, as discussed
earlier, there are both cognitive and neural differences
between true and false memories, it is not at all clear that
those differences can be reliably detected in individual
cases, as required in the courtroom: most studies that
have used neuroimaging to distinguish true and false
memories have done so by averaging across subjects and
groups.
113 Some recent evidence indicates that neu-
roimaging can be used to gain insights into the subjective
experience of remembering in an individual subject on a
single trial. Using a classification technique known as
multivoxel pattern analysis, researchers were able to use
a pattern classifier to accurately detect when individuals
believed that they were remembering a specific event,
regardless of whether the event had actually occurred.
114
However, the pattern classifier could not reliably deter-
mine the objective status of memory for single events,
that is, whether the rememberer’s belief about the event
was accurate—a failure that would clearly limit its applic-
ability in the courtroom, at least for now. Other limita-
tions of current research include the fact that laboratory
studies have typically used college students as partici-
pants, whereas a much more diverse set of individuals are
involved in real-world cases of eyewitness memory, and
have also tended to use materials, such as word lists or
pictures of shapes and objects, that may have limited
application to everyday experiences.
115
Interestingly, recent work using structural imaging has
revealed that individual differences in reality monitor-
ing ability—ie, the capacity to distinguish whether a pre-
viously encountered item came from an internal or
external source—are linked to structural differences
across individuals in the volume of the paracingulate sul-
cus within the medial anterior prefrontal cortex, a region
that was previously linked to reality monitoring perfor-
mance in functional neuroimaging studies.
116 It should be
useful to examine in future research whether informa-
tion from structural imaging can be combined with func-
tional neuroimaging data to improve discrimination
between true and false memories in individual cases.
In light of the foregoing considerations and the material
discussed earlier, it is clear that research on constructive
memory can help to address some major theoretical
questions concerning the nature and function of mem-
ory, as well as key applied issues that have important
clinical and everyday consequences. Much work remains
to be done in order to deepen our understanding of the
neural basis and cognitive properties of constructive
memory. But it seems clear that attempting to under-
stand constructive memory processes by integrating per-
spectives from cognitive psychology and neuroscience
has proven to be a productive approach in recent years,
and there is every reason to believe that such an
approach will continue to pay dividends in the future. ❏
Acknowledgements: Preparation of this chapter was supported by NIMH
MH060941. I thank Clifford Robbins for help with preparation of the
manuscript.
PAGES_12_AG_1006_BA.qxd:DCNS#52  10/03/12  12:46  Page 15State of the art
16
Memoria constructiva: pasado y futuro
La memoria humana no es una reproducción literal
del pasado, sino que se basa en procesos construc-
tivos que algunas veces tienden al error y la distor-
sión. La comprensión de la memoria constructiva ha
avanzado durante los últimos años como resultado
de la investigación que ha relacionado sus bases
cognitivas y neurales. Este artículo se enfoca en tres
aspectos de la memoria constructiva que han sido
objetivos de la investigación reciente: 1) la idea que
ciertos tipos de distorsiones de memoria reflejan
cómo operan los procesos cognitivos de adaptación
que contribuyen al eficiente funcionamiento de la
memoria, 2) el papel del sistema de memoria cons-
tructiva en la imaginación o simulación de posibles
eventos futuros y 3) las diferencias entre memorias
verdaderas y falsas, las que han sido evidenciadas
por técnicas de neuroimágenes funcionales. Este
artículo bosqueja las sugerencias teóricas de la
investigación más importante y también considera
algunas consecuencias clínicas y aplicadas. 
Mémoire constructive : passée et future
La mémoire humaine n’est pas une reproduction lit-
térale du passé ; elle est plutôt fondée sur des pro-
cessus constructifs parfois susceptibles d’erreurs et
de distorsion. La compréhension de la mémoire
constructive s’est accélérée ces dernières années
grâce à la recherche qui a établi un lien entre ses
bases cognitives et neurales. Cet article s’intéresse
aux trois aspects de la mémoire constructive qui ont
fait l’objet de recherches récentes : 1) l’idée que cer-
tains types de distorsion mnésique reflètent l’effet
de processus cognitifs adaptatifs qui contribuent à
un fonctionnement efficient de la mémoire ; 2) le
rôle d’un système de mémoire constructive dans
l’imagination ou la simulation des événements
futurs possibles ; 3) et des différences entre les
mémoires vraie et fausse révélées par des tech-
niques de neuro-imagerie fonctionnelle. Cet article
décrit les implications théoriques d’une recherche
pertinente, et présente également quelques impli-
cations cliniques et appliquées.
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